October 21st 2017,

Just one story….

Since my testimony will not be made public before long. Better not wait to describe what was in it and draw the line in the sand with my later inferences. As said, this is always the same story on my part that has to be layered as it must uncover one by one the many smokes and mirrors that would be planted by the bank, some financial media outlets and some authorities as well. This part will show the role played by the regulators all along and how they influenced the emergence of the scandal ahead of times, through the events and after the events of 2012. It will start with the “beginning”, ie an extended translation of a French text that had been published back in early July on the website of Paul Jorion (see official versions vs facts). As such it will summarize my steady “story” versus the changing tales conveyed by the bank and the ones of all the authorities that have covered the “London whale” case. Needless to say that the media coverage is still far away from the truth in late 2017…

The recent changes in the official versions are crucial in that they show the real scandal and that $billions of fines and litigation expenses could have been avoided for the same overall gross tangible capital gain…. Had the top executives adopted my advices which were dictated just by good common sense the bank would have spared for itself about $15 billion in penalties. The bank top executive saw very well what common sense dictated but they would decide to do otherwise as “JPM gains in 2012” and “VaR History” showed in September 2017. As said then however, an ambiguity remained about my testimony, my “story” and “who had changed what”. I have had just one story to tell though….

Thus this part will describe how this story of mine here differs from the official many ones irrespective of whether the Bank or the Authorities conveyed them. This part will show that my “story” shall not change at all in the future although it will keep showing other layers of “smokes and mirrors”. To be sure, as opposed to my “story”, the official versions as of late 2017 are not correct at least because they have been changing over time and because they are now tainted by ambiguities that should not be there. And the texts in this part of the website will show where the “official” versions are grossly inaccurate.

The text translated from the one published on Paul Jorion website in late June 2017 will just show the 3 main points of fundamental disagreement between my quite steady “story” and the many fluctuating versions of all the other parties involved.

(see official versions vs facts).

Through these 3 points it will appear clearly that, had the bank simply followed my advices in 2011 or early 2012 the scandal would have been avoided at the expense of a high liquidity reserve, worth of 2 years of profits (yes that is big but that was affordable). But that would have been one reserve that would prove to be temporary and easily funded in 2012. The funding would have been justified by the obvious tangible projected gain in capital that would materialize mostly by the end of 2014. The bank would then have avoided paying $14 billion in fines, been spared paying many more $billions in litigation expenses and divesting some activities. That was indeed a big, big mistake that could have been avoided simply by following what common sense suggested so visibly. But the top executives of the bank would not act like this. And none of the regulators would recognize the actual role that I played then for what it had been.

Next this part will thus show that such a paradox was not left at all to chance or coincidence or negligence despite some “elements of surprise” like this website for example. These 3 points will be further developed through 5 key facts, 5 key realities and 3 key dates that have been constantly left in the shadow. (see  5 facts -5 realities - 3 dates) These 5 facts, 5 realities and 3 dates were known even before the first seminal articles would be published and were quietly disclosed through the Task Force report (January 2013) and the US Senate Report (March 2013 and November 2013). Yet they would be ignored as much as my actual role was, something which would allow the official reports to convey a very misleading account of the events to the public stage in 2013. The diversion would turn out to be systematic. To show this I will simply comment and connect the dots further based upon the “june 2016 project letter” by commenting further what “my recent statements and writings” stated already. It will be time indeed to review this “June 2016 letter project” that would be amply communicated between June 2016 and June 2017 to some media and to the public via the website. This letter was a compendium of extracts that are publicly available since 2013 and are showing that indeed the public reports of the authorities and the bank were all mischaracterizing the facts and events of the time already in 2013 ( see 2013 the morphing tales). It also shows the steady self-consistency of my own “story”, despite what the WSJ would suggest in August 2017.

Therefore there will be on the follow also a focus on the conclusions disclosed by the US authorities and the one that has been widely advertized by the WSJ in August 2017. A quick reminder of the last part that was published in late September 2017 will follow to introduce more fundamental descriptions of how the facts have been systematically distorted in the every public reports so far. see Not reliable

At last my two testimonies will be exposed in further details not as a verbatim but as per the descriptions that they conveyed. See for that purpose Confidential Impunity. This will show that not only these 5 facts; 5 realities and 3 dates mattered. This will also show how much they actually mattered for the investigation teams themselves all along. Let’s be clear: all the investigation teams will focus on these 5 facts, 5 realities and 3 dates. But they will next ignore vastly my testimony. Yet I was truthful, “corroborated”, “knowledgeable” and heavily “documented”. The reader will both see my actual role that indeed would have spared the bank a minimum $15 billion of expenses while achieving the very same end gross result. And the reader will see that there is no acceptable reason to keep this testimony under confidential seal and no reason to not convey the right account of the events. And yet the bank and all the authorities keep this account away from the public eye in 2017. And what about the media outlets who started the “London whale” misleading legend by the way?